The only thing that is problematic is the attempt to achieve these goals by coercive means, in particular by means of the coercive apparatus of the state. On the contrary, they can be praiseworthy and we might have nonenforceable duties to engage in them. This does not, however, imply that non-coercive strategies for the achievement of these goals are ruled out. Governments, as well as individuals, are not permitted to restrain or constrain others for altruistic or paternalistic reasons. He wants to minimize the use of force and coercion, restricting its legitimate employment to the protection of individual rights. This criticism and rejection of coercion and force is combined with an emphasis on voluntarism that is present throughout Nozick’s works. In short, there is no room for redistribution or paternalism within a Nozickian state. Such prohibitions, regulations and paternalistic policies are ruled out by the rights of individuals. The same holds for various regulations attempting to modify the behaviour of individuals by rendering actions that are deemed to be undesirable either more expensive or even outright illegal. Redistributionist policies are consequently ruled out as illegitimate. Rights are side constraints on actions and trump all competing considerations, such as considerations of equality or welfare. The welfare of other people or of oneself does not constitute an adequate ground for justifying interference. Neither altruistically nor paternalistically inspired intervention is justified. For example, it implies that the state is not permitted to coerce people to help others and is not allowed to coerce people for their own good. This is a radical political philosophy that has many important implications. Not only is a minimal state the only legitimate state, it is also an inspiring state. (This is the conclusion of Part II.) Moreover, Nozick contends, a minimal state that complies with these moral restrictions constitutes an attractive ideal since it is a framework for utopia. If a state transgresses the narrow boundaries defined by rights, then it becomes an illegitimate state since it violates the rights of individuals. (This is what Nozick attempts to establish in Part I.) Nonetheless, rights place important constraints on any legitimate state, thereby ensuring that only a minimal state is justified. In other words, the anarchist’s challenge can be met insofar as we can fi nd room for a legitimate state that is compatible with individual rights. That is, the state is not intrinsically immoral, but can arise in a legitimate manner. Nozick summarizes the main conclusions of his book by saying that ‘a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified that any more extensive state will violate persons’ rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified and that the minimal state is inspiring as well as right’ (p. Having defended the legitimacy of the state, he then challenges the dominant view by showing that only a minimal state is legitimate and that anything more extensive violates rights. He argues against the anarchist’s claim that every form of government is illegitimate, that states are intrinsically immoral and that only anarchy constitutes a justified societal arrangement. In particular, he takes the anarchist’s challenge seriously and raises the question whether the acceptance of individual rights leaves any room for legitimate governments.
He intends to assess whether the existence of a state can be justified at all and what functions it can legitimately perform. His book is an attempt to examine the implications of this claim for our understanding of the legitimate functions of the state, while also providing support in favour of this moral outlook and criticisms of alternative views. This claim constitutes the basis of Nozick’s political philosophy and moral outlook. 10-14).įamously, Nozick begins his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia with the claim: ‘Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)’ (p.
Below is an extract (the first section of Chapter 2) of Ralf Bader’s most excellent and crisp Robert Nozick (pp.
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